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Abstract
Reputation concerns can discipline agents to take costly effort and generate good
outcomes. But what if outcomes are not always observed? We consider a model of
reputation with shifting observability, and ask how this affects agents’ incentives. We
identify a novel and intuitive mechanism by which infrequent observation or inatten-
tion can actually strengthen reputation incentives and encourage effort. If an agent
anticipates that outcomes may not be observed in the future, the benefits from effort
today are enhanced due to a “coasting” effect. By investing effort when outcomes are
more likely observed, the agent can improve her reputation, and when the audience is
inattentive in the future, she can coast on this reputation without additional effort. We
show that future opportunities to rest on one’s laurels can lead to greater overall effort
and higher efficiency than constant observation. This has implications for the design
of review systems or performance feedback systems in organizations. We provide a
characterization of the optimal observability structure to maximize efficient effort in
our setting.
1 Introduction
Reputation concerns are an important driver of incentives. Examples are ubiquitous:
A manager must work hard to develop a reputation for effectiveness; a chef must
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consistently delivery high quality meals to earn a good reputation for her restaurant;
and so on. Reputation affects an agent’s behavior because actions taken today affect
others’ beliefs about the agent’s type and likely actions in the future. Indeed, economic
agents take costly effort to generate outcomes that can improve their reputation. But,
in many settings, outcomes are not always observed by the audience. This may be
because of institutional details like the frequency of performance reviews or because
the audience is inattentive: A manager’s performance is not evaluated every day. Every
consumer does not pay attention to the quality of meal at a restaurant and rate it on
Yelp. But, if the agent’s actions today do not have an impact on what is observed, then
reputation concerns may no longer work as an effective disciplining device. What does
changing observability mean for agents’ incentives to invest in reputation building?
This is the central question we ask in this paper.
The question is important not just to get a positive description of reputation build-
ing in settings with an inattentive audience, but also to address design questions about
optimal performance feedback mechanisms. There is a vast (and, in an increasingly
digital age, growing) variety of ways in which information can be gathered and dis-
seminated. Understanding how the extent and nature of available information can
affect the strength of reputation incentives is, therefore, a key building block in under-
standing economic outcomes, making predictions for their evolution, and informing
the design of institutions for information-gathering and information dissemination (in-
cluding personnel review systems, credit-scoring, and consumer reviews of products,
restaurants, and hotels).
An inattentive audience can surely dampen an agent’s incentive to work hard: For
instance, at one extreme, if the audience never paid attention to outcomes, exerting
effort to obtain better outcomes cannot be useful in building reputation. However,
this need not imply that more frequent observations necessarily strengthen reputation-
based incentives. Indeed, the main insight of this paper is that inattention can sharpen
an agent’s incentive to invest in reputation building. We identify a novel and intuitive
mechanism by which inattention can encourage effort. If the agent anticipates that the
audience will be inattentive in the future this can increase the benefits from working
hard today. Exerting effort in periods when her action is likely observed, allows the
agent to get the future reward of “coasting” (earning a reward for this reputation even
while exerting no effort) in periods when her action is likely unobserved. When the
audience is inattentive in the future, the agent will be able to shirk and coast on his
reputation without any additional effort. We show that such opportunities to coast or
rest on one’s laurels in the future can actually lead to greater overall effort and higher
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efficiency than constant observation. Thus, a review system such as a consumer report
magazine (e.g. Michelin or Zagat guide) that assesses and reports on quality relatively
infrequently can perform better than a system with continual assessment (such as on-
line reviews on Yelp). Similarly, performance review systems in organizations that
engage in periodic assessment (e.g. tenure review) can be more effective at generating
effort than continual assessment.
This result may run counter to the intuition of a reader used to thinking in contract-
theoretic terms. In a seminal paper, Holmström (1979) presents the informativeness
principle. In a contractual setting any measure of performance that reveals information
about an agent’s action improves the performance of a compensation contract; loosely
speaking, more information is necessarily better. Instead, in a reputation environment,
this need not be the case since the rewards associated with a belief about the agent’s
action are not chosen but instead arise endogenously. Information, in effect plays twin
roles in indicating the likelihood that an agent took one action rather than another,
and in determining the rewards for that action.1 In our setting, less frequent obser-
vation has these twin effects: On the one hand, it dampens the incentive to work in
the current period, because working and shirking are observationally equivalent when
the audience is not paying attention. On the other hand, infrequent observation can
also lead to greater rewards from reputation in the future because the agent will be
able to maintain her reputation without taking any costly actions for a few periods in
the future when actions are not observed. We show that the second effect may dom-
inate: Reputation-based incentives may be too weak to discipline behavior if actions
are observed in every period; but, infrequent observation might impose some disci-
pline, exactly because the agent knows that hard work today will give an opportunity
to “coast” on a good reputation later.
We present a stylized and simple model that allows us to characterize when more
frequent observation leads to stronger reputation-based incentives. To simplify the
problem we initially suppose that outcomes are either perfectly observed or not ob-
served at all. We refer to the former case as one where the audience is paying attention,
and the latter as a situation where the audience is inattentive. In our baseline model
the audience’s current attention level depends only on whether he was paying attention
yesterday.
In this environment, we demonstrate the following results. If efficient effort can
be sustained when outcomes are observed in every period then limiting observation
1See Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole (1999) who nicely describe this phenomenon and the possibility that
information can act in these two opposing directions in a one-period career concerns model.
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can (trivially) never lead to a more efficient outcome but can lead to a less efficient
one. However, more generally, infrequent observation can lead to more or less effort
by a strategic long-lived player. Indeed, less frequent observation can lead to a more
efficient average level of effort than when outcomes are observed in every period,
through the coasting effect described above.
The fact that inattention can sharpen the incentive to work hard can, however,
imply some perverse effects: In particular, inattention can encourage agents to exert
costly effort even when this effort is inefficient and welfare-reducing.
We also characterize the optimal attention process (among two-state Markov pro-
cesses) that maximizes effort incentives. If the agent is patient, then it is easy to
provide incentives to exert effort. But away from the patient limit, constant attention
may not be optimal. Instead, the coasting effect can strengthen effort incentives and
the optimal information structure is such that the inattentive state occurs often, but is
short-lived. This makes the agent work “extra” hard when she anticipates that she will
be able to rest on her laurels later, but inattention does not last too long so as to lower
the average amount of effort in the long run, and so that its benefits are not discounted
too much through time preferences.
Another subtle insight that emerges is that some form of predictability in attention
is what underlies the ability to coast. For instance, if the current attention state of the
audience were not at all persistent but just independently drawn in every period, then
the coasting effect would not arise. Inattention can help discipline the agent only when
the agent can predict it, and therefore wants to work hard and improve her reputation
in order to rest on her laurels later. Persistence in attention (and inattention) allows
some predictability which gives rise to the coasting effect.
We consider variations of our baseline setting. We find that the coasting intuition
is robust to the introduction of imperfect monitoring, or to changes in the information
structure (specifically, we characterize outcomes if the agent were not aware of the
current attention state). Further, it may be reasonable to assume that the attention
state does not evolve exogenously, but rather depends on the current reputation of the
agent. For instance, a customer may be unlikely to pay attention when the reputation
of the firm is very high or very low, thinking that there is not much to be learnt from
observing another outcome, but may be much more attentive at intermediate beliefs.
We show that the coasting effect is still robust in this setting.
4
Related Literature
The literature on reputation in economics is extensive.2 Much of this work, following
Fudenberg and Levine (1989, 1992) focuses on payoff bounds for a patient long-run
player facing a sequence of short-run players when there is uncertainty regarding the
long-run player’s type. These papers take the mapping from actions to observations
as constant through time. What distinguishes this paper from existing literature is our
focus on monitoring that changes over time, while maintaining the classic perspective
that observations are commonly observed by all interested parties.
Closer in spirit are papers by Liu (2011), Liu and Skrzypacz (2014), Ekmekci
(2009) in which all information is not passed on directly between different genera-
tions of short-run players, but rather only recent outcomes are observed. This can
sustain uncertainty about the long-run agent’s type and, thereby, sustain reputation in-
centives.3 This is an important feature in the context of the work of Cripps, Mailath
and Samuelson (2004) which shows that under imperfect monitoring, reputation ef-
fects cannot be sustained in perpetuity. In our baseline model, as in the classical work
of Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982), we consider perfect
monitoring (or no monitoring at all) so that reputation effects can play a role even in
the long-run. The perfect monitoring structure gives us tractability and allows us to
develop intuition that extends under imperfect monitoring.
Our work is substantively related to recent work on the design of feedback sys-
tems.4 Dellarocas (2006) considers the effect of infrequent reviews in a pure moral
hazard setting. The effects are quite different: In Dellarocas (2006) infrequent review
is useful for obtaining a signal that reduces noise. In our setting, infrequent review
leads to less information collected and may be optimal when monitoring is perfect
whereas in Dellarocas (2006) it would be optimal to update in every period.5 In re-
cent contemporaneous work, Hörner and Lambert (2016) explore the optimal design
of Gaussian feedback systems in a continuous time career concerns model.
2Mailath and Samuelson (2006), Mailath and Samuelson (Forthcoming), Cripps (2006), MacLeod (2007)
and Bar-Isaac and Tadelis (2008) provide useful and complementary surveys of the broad literature on repu-
tation.
3The literature has described other mechanisms to sustain such uncertainty, including exogenous type
changes, Holmström (1999); name-trading, Tadelis (2002) and Mailath and Samuelson (2001); and organi-
zational design, Bar-Isaac (2007).
4See Dellarocas, Dini and Spagnolo (2006) for a broad overview and, notably, Ekmekci (2009) on how
much information should be passed on to new consumers.
5See also Fuchs (2007) who considers optimal review period in a relational contracting environment (that
is with pure moral hazard and an ongoing relationship rather than a series of short-lived agents) with private
imperfect monitoring.
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The effect of monitoring structure on reputation is also related to recent work by
Bohren (2016), Board and ter Vehn (2013), Board and ter Vehn (2015), and the re-
lated one period model of Fleckinger, Glachant and Moineville (2015), though they
consider the effect of different information structures in an environment where the
“type” of the long-run player is not constant throughout the game, but the result of
an exogenous constant stochastic process and the player’s actions. A nascent litera-
ture is beginning to consider endogenous monitoring structures in environments where
incentives arise through reputation or similar forces; in particular, Garcia (2014) con-
siders endogenous monitoring where reputation is for the extent to which an advisor
has aligned preferences with a principal; Halac and Prat (2016) consider an environ-
ment with two-sided learning; and Dana and Spier (2015a,b) consider firm strategies
that affect market monitoring as a means of commitment to investing in quality.
The broader insight that in non-contractual environments less information might
be helpful to a principal unable to commit in advance to rewards is well articulated
in Cremer (1995), Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) and Kessler (1998), for example.
Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole (1999) illustrate in a one period career concerns model
that information may vary in the extent to which it reflects effort and the extent to
which it reflects an agent’s type and, so, affects the rewards to particular observations.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present the model.
In Section 3, we characterize all equilibria and demonstrate the coasting effect. Sec-
tion 4 discusses welfare and characterizes the optimal inattention process to maximize
effort. In Section 5, we discuss the intuition behind the coasting effect, and Section 6
discusses robustness.
2 Model and Preliminaries
There is a long-lived firm that faces a continuum of short-lived consumers. The firm
can be one of two types: C , the commitment type or O, the opportunistic or normal
type. Opportunistic firms have two possible action choices: high effort and low effort;
a ∈ {H,L} where L is costless and taking action H costs c > 0. C-firms are commit-
ted to exerting high effort always. We let φt denote the belief at the start of period t
that the firm is the C type. The firm’s action can produce one of two possible outcomes
- good or bad y ∈ {g, b}. High effort is more likely to produce a good outcome than
low effort; i.e., .P (y = g|h) = η and P (y = g|l) = ν with η > ν. Note that the case
of η = 1 and ν = 0 represents “perfect monitoring.” Most of the paper addresses this
case. Consumers value a good outcome at 1 and a bad outcome at 0.
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At the start of any period t, consumers are in one of two attention states: Attentive
and inattentive; i.e., ωt ∈ {A, I}. When ωt = A, they all observe the outcome,
and when ωt = I , they do not. The consumers’ attention state follows a Markov
process: If the consumers are in the inattentive state (ωt = I), then with probability ι,
the state remains inattentive in the next period. If consumers are attentive (ωt = A)
then with probability α the state transitions to being inattentive in the next period.
Note that ι = α would mean independent state transitions. Further, note that this







1−ι+α represent the proportion of time consumers
spends in the inattentive and attentive states respectively.
The timing of the game is as follows.
1. At the start of any period t, φt ∈ [0, 1] denotes the current belief that firm is a
C-type, and ωt ∈ {A, I} denotes the current attention state.
2. The firm first collects the payment from the consumer pt(φt, ωt).
3. Then the firm makes its effort choice, at ∈ {H,L}, and an outcome, yt ∈ {g, b},
is realized.
4. The outcome is observed or not by consumers, depending on the current atten-
tion state.
5. Consumers update their belief about the firm’s type to φt+1.
6. An attention state ωt+1 is realized.
7. Play proceeds to next period.
We restrict attention to Markov perfect equilibria.
Definition 1. A Markov perfect equilibrium is a tuple (τ(λ, ω), p(λ, ω), λg , λb, λI )
such that:
• At any belief and attention state (φ, ω), it is optimal for the firm to play H with
probability τ(φ, ω).
• The customer is willing to pay p(φ, ω) which is the expected utility of the con-
sumer given φ, ω and τ(φ, ω); i.e., p(φ, ω) = φ+ (1− φ)τ(φ, ω).
• The posterior belief of customers, after observing outcomes g, b or nothing (in





φ+ (1− φ)τ(φ, ω)
φb(φ, ω) = 0 φI(φ, ω) = φ.
We start with two basic observations. First, in any MPE, the agent never exerts
effort at degenerate beliefs. To see why, note that the only reason the agent takes effort
is to affect the consumers’ belief about his type. Therefore, there is no incentive to
exert effort at degenerate beliefs. Second, given the timing within every period, in any
MPE the agent never exerts effort in the inattentive state.
3 Inattention and the Opportunity to Coast
We characterize all MPE in this environment under perfect monitoring. There are two
types of pure strategy equilibria: one in which the agent never exerts effort and another
in which he exerts effort at interior beliefs in the attentive state. We characterize
the conditions for existence of these two classes of equilibria. We then show that
inattention can be good for effort incentives. We start by characterizing the equilibrium
with no effort.
Proposition 2 (No effort equilibrium). The necessary and sufficient condition for the
existence of an MPE with low effort at every belief and in both attentive and inattentive




Proof. The firm’s payoff from exerting no effort in the attentive state is given by φt+0.
If the firm deviates and exerts effort in the attentive state, then his payoff is given by
φt − c +
δ
1−δ . It follows that, no effort in all states is an equilibrium if and only if
δ
1−δ < c.
The proposition above tells us that if a player is patient (for δ large enough), never
exerting effort cannot be an equilibrium. The intuition is straightforward. A patient
agent will be tempted to deviate and exert costly effort today because this single devi-
ation will convince consumers that he is the commitment type, and will yield the best
possible payoffs forever in the future. It is also worth noting that the condition for
existence of this equilibrium with no effort does not depend on the extent of attention
6For ease of exposition, we present the payment and updating rules for the case of perfect monitoring that
constitutes the majority of the paper. Analogous, though more cumbersome expressions for p(φ, ω), φg(φ, ω)
and φb(φ, ω) arise for the more general imperfect monitoring case.
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(independent of α or β). The next result presents the condition for existence of an
equilibrium with effort at every interior belief in the attentive state. (Recall that there
is never any effort exertion in equilibrium in the inattentive state).
Proposition 3 (Full effort equilibrium). The necessary and sufficient condition for the
existence of an MPE with high effort in attentive states and low effort in the inattentive








Proof. First, consider necessity. For an equilibrium with full effort in the attentive
state at any interior belief φ, we can write down the value functions, given belief φ and
attention state as follows:
V (φ,A) = 1− c+ δαV (φ, I) + δ(1 − α)V (φ,A)
and
V (φ, I) = φ+ διV (φ, I) + δ(1 − ι)V (φ,A).
We can solve the above to obtain:
V (φ,A) =
(1− c)(1− ιδ) + αδφ
(1− δ) (1 + αδ − ιδ)
and V (φ, I) =
δ(1 − c)(1 − ι) + φ(1− δ(1 − α))
(1− δ) (1 + αδ − ιδ)
For effort to be optimal, the agent must prefer working hard to exerting no effort, i.e.,
the agent will not deviate to shirking as long as
δαV (φ, I) + δ(1 − α)V (φ,A) > c.








For sufficiency, the proof is similarly straightforward. Suppose that the condition in
the proposition holds. Then, from the algebra above, we know that the agent would
prefer working hard to shirking. Therefore, exerting effort at every interior belief in
the attentive state, and shirking otherwise is an MPE.
9
3.1 Coasting Effect
Notice that the condition (1) for a full effort equilibrium to exist does depend on the
level of inattention. In particular, when there is no inattention (i.e., α = ι = 0),
then this condition reduces to c < δ. At the other extreme, when inattention is likely
and almost absorbing (α = ι ≈ 1), the condition reduces to c < δφ1−δ . This implies
that inattention can be good for effort incentives: When φ > 1 − δ, the full effort
equilibrium is easier to sustain under inattention than with full attention. The intuition
behind this is the “coasting” effect. When the agent knows that the attentive state is
likely to transition to a persistent inattentive state, then she has a greater incentive to
exert effort in the attentive state because this will allow her to maintain her reputation
and enter the inattentive state with this high reputation. If she enters the inattentive
state with a high reputation, she can later shirk in equilibrium but continue to coast on
her reputation and reap the benefits. Further, the rewards from coasting are monotonic
in the current reputation level. Formally, note that the effort incentive is easier to
satisfy when φ is higher.
If inattention can help provide the incentive to exert effort, a natural question is
whether inattention then improves welfare. The answer is prima facie ambiguous. On
the one hand, inattention can be welfare enhancing because it induces effort exertion
even when effort cannot be sustained by full attention. On the other hand, inattention
can be bad for welfare by inducing effort in equilibrium even when effort is socially
inefficient (say c >> 1). Moreover, a welfare analysis needs to take into account the
average effort taken over time. In the next section, we provide a complete welfare
analysis. First, we complete the characterization of equilibria.
3.2 Mixed strategy equilibria
Above, we characterized all pure strategy Markov-perfect equilibria. There are two
types of pure equilibria: one with no effort and the other will effort at interior beliefs
in the attentive state. It is easy to show that both types of pure equilibria cannot exist
simultaneously. Further, pure strategy MPE do not always exist: in particular, there




≤ c ≤ δ1−δ . For completeness, we
look for mixed strategy equilibria in this range.




α(1 − δ − φ)
1− ιδ
)








Then, there exists an MPE in which the firm mixes between high and low effort in the
first attentive period and then (in case of high effort) switches to always exerting high
effort in attentive states.
We relegate the proof to the appendix. It turns out that this is the only type of
mixing that is possible in equilibrium.
Proposition 5. There is no MPE in which the firm
1. Mixes in the first attentive state and then shifts to low effort forever, or
2. Mixes in two consecutive periods of attention.




< δ1−δ , we can see that,
even allowing for mixing, the existence of MPE is still not guaranteed everywhere.7
4 Welfare: Optimal inattention
Next, we ask the question of whether inattention can improve welfare. We will look
at the planner’s problem. As long as effort is efficient, (c < 1), the planner wants high
effort as often as possible.8 Looking at the stationary distribution of states, we know
that the proportion of time spent in the attentive state is 1−ι1−ι+α . We want to find the
level of inattention (α and ι) that results in the maximum effort exertion while satis-
fying incentive compatibility (the agent must prefer effort to no effort in all attentive




s.t. c ≤ δ
(
1− α




Notice that if 1 − δ − φ > 0, then a lower α and lower ι make both IC easier
to satisfy. Moreover, the objective function is decreasing in α and ι. So, α = 0 and
ι = 0 is optimal; that is, if the agent is sufficiently patient then it is optimal to be
fully attentive. In particular, if c ≤ δ this will ensure that the agent always exerts high
effort.
7This arises, in part, since we have made the somewhat stark (if common) assumption that at the degener-
ate belief φ = 1 there is no updating in the (off-equilibrium) case that bad outcomes are observed. This is key
for the threshold in Proposition 2. Relaxing this assumption can allow for multiplicity at some parameters,
though the qualitative effects described in this paper and, in particular, the characterization of Proposition 3
still apply.
8The case where effort is inefficient (c > 1) is trivial. Optimality can be ensured by setting α = ι = 1 so
that the audience is never attentive.
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Next suppose that 1 − δ − φ < 0. Then, if c ≤ δ, then we should set again
α = ι = 0. Finally consider the case of 1 − δ − φ < 0 and c > δ. Then, it is
no longer optimal to be fully attentive; instead, the optimal choice will be ι = 0 and
α = δ−c
δ(1−δ−φ) as long as this α < 1. Here, the inattentive state never lasts more than
a single period—as soon as the state becomes inattentive it is guaranteed to become
attentive in the next period; instead there is some persistence in the attentive state. In
case δ−c
δ(1−δ−φ) > 1 then the optimal solution hits a different corner of the parameter
space and sets α = 1 (so that there is an immediate transition from the attentive to
inattentive state) and ι = δ(δ+φ)−c
δ(δ−c) . This is always feasible because 0 <
δ(δ+φ)−c
δ(δ−c) < 1
as long as c ∈ (δ, 1).
This discussion can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 6. Inattention improves welfare relative to the full attention benchmark
whenever c > δ and 1−δ−φ < 0. In particular, the optimal information structure has
ι = 0 and α = δ−c
δ(1−δ−φ) whenever feasible, and ι =
δ(δ+φ)−c
δ(δ−c) and α = 1 otherwise.
To see the intuition, notice that if the agent is patient, then it is easy to provide in-
centives to exert effort. So, the coasting effect can arise only when the discount factor
is not too high. Further, when the coasting effect can arise, the optimal information
structure is such that the inattentive state occurs often, but is short-lived. This makes
the agent work “extra” hard when she anticipates that she will be able to coast later,
but inattention does not last too long so that the benefits of resting on one’s laurels are
not discounted too much, but instead arise more frequently.
5 Importance of predictability
A useful insight is that some form of predictability in the attention states is exactly
what underlies the ability to coast. To see this clearly, consider the baseline setting
in this paper. If α = ι = 12 , then transitions between states are independent, and the
current state is not helpful in predicting the attention state in the future. In this case,
the condition for full-effort equilibria to be sustained (Condition (1)) reduces to c <
δ(1−φ)
2−δ . On the other hand, under full attention (for α = ι = 0), the condition for full
effort to be sustained in equilibrium is given by c < δ. Notice that the first threshold
is lower than the second threshold, which means that attention per se cannot improve
the incentive to exert effort. Inattention can help discipline the agent only when the
agent can predict it, and therefore wants to work hard and improve her reputation and
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rest on her laurels later. Therefore, the persistence in the attention states is what gives
rise to the coasting effect.
To appreciate the importance of predictability, let us ask whether the coasting ef-
fect arises in our baseline setting if the firm never observed the attention state. If
the attention state is not observed, then from the firm’s perspective, there is no pre-
dictability. It is straightforward to show that in this case, inattention can only make
effort exertion harder to sustain in equilibrium. The interested reader may refer to the
Appendix A.2 for the details.
6 How robust is the coasting effect?
6.1 Can coasting arise under imperfect monitoring?
The reader may wonder whether our results are robust to the monitoring structure: If
we consider a setting with imperfect monitoring is it still the case that inattention can
be helpful for reputational incentives? It turns out that this is indeed the case. Rather
than present a complete analysis of the imperfect monitoring setting, we develop an
example to establish this. In particular we show that no effort can be an equilibrium
under full attention when it cannot be an equilibrium with some inattention.9 In this
sense, inattention can be good for incentives.
Proposition 7. There exist parameter ranges in which no effort can be sustained as
an equilibrium under full attention, but is not an equilibrium with some inattention.
The idea is as follows. We start with a range of parameter values c, η, ν, δ such
that no effort is sustainable as an equilibrium under full attention (α = ι = 0). We
then compare this with a situation in which ι = α ≈ 1; i.e., inattention is an absorbing
state, and the attentive state transits to the inattentive state almost surely. The agent
may not want to shirk: The agent can deviate to working today to increase the reputa-
tion and coast on it in indefinitely for the future. We provide the formal proof in the
Supplementary Appendix.
9It turns out that full effort equilibria (effort at all interior beliefs) do not exist under imperfect monitoring.
This is why we demonstrate the coasting effect under imperfect monitoring with no effort equilibria.
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6.2 What if the firm does not observe the current attention
state?
In our setting, when the firm makes an action choice, it knows the current attention
state of the customer. Indeed, this drives why the firm never exerts effort in the inat-
tentive state. However, in many applications it may be more reasonable to assume that
the agent cannot observe whether the audience will pay attention in the current period
(but can observe the attention states of the past). As we show in the Supplementary
Appendix B.2, the qualitative results are unchanged. The coasting effect still arises in
the sense that, there are equilibria with no effort that are sustainable under full atten-
tion but not sustainable with some inattention. To see why the timing does not make
a difference recall that the coasting effect is primarily driven by some predictability
in the attention states. When the agent can predict that there will be a chance for her
to shirk in equilibrium in the future, she has an extra incentive to work hard in the
present. The timing of actions within a period is not crucial to this intuition.
6.3 What if consumer attention depends on the reputation
of firm?
In many applications, it is reasonable to assume that the attention state depends on
the current reputation of the firm. For instance, a customer may be unlikely to pay
attention when the reputation of the firm is very high or very low, thinking that there
is little to learn from observing another outcome. The customer may be much more
attentive at intermediate beliefs. Would coasting still arise?
As a final extension, we analyze a model in which the customer’s attention does
not evolve as a Markov process, but rather depends on the current reputation of the
firm. In particular, we assume that the observability state is a function of reputation:
The customer pays attention if the current reputation φt is such that φt ∈ ΦA ⊂ [0, 1],
and does not pay attention otherwise. The interested reader may refer to the online
Supplementary Appendix for the formal model and analysis. It turns out that, once
again, inattention can be helpful for effort incentives. There are equilibria in which
full effort can be sustained under inattention, but not under full attention. The coasting
intuition is robust: The agent has a stronger incentive to work hard at certain beliefs
when she knows that the consumer is likely to become inattentive in the future.
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A Appendix: Proofs of results
A.1 Mixed Strategies
Proof of Proposition 4





1 − δ − φg
1− ιδ
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(1−ι)V (φg, A))+δ(1−α)V (φg, A)
If the firm works forever, we have V (φg, A) =
(1−c)(1−ιδ)+αδφg
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(1− δ) (1 + αδ − ιδ)
)+δ(1−α)
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φ+(1−φ)τ . Substituting into the expression for c, we get
c =













αδ(1 − δ) + ιδ2 + c(1 − ιδ)− δ
− 1
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α(1 − δ − φ)
1− ιδ
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1− δ − φg
1− ιδ
)
It turns out that that this does not pose an additional constraint, because if we substitute
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in the value of c in terms of φg , we see that the above expression holds at equality.
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. 1. Suppose that there was an MPE in which the firm mixed in the attentive
state and then switched to shirking forever. Mixing requires
φ+ (1− φ)τ − c+ δαV (φg, I) + δ(1 − α)V (φg, A) = φ+ (1− φ)τ,
which implies
c = δαV (φg, I) + δ(1 − α)V (φg, A)
Since the firm always shirks under inattention, we have






(1− ι)V (φt, A).







(1− ι)V (φg, A)) + δ(1 − α)V (φg, A).
Shirking forever from the next period can be unstained in equilibrium only if
δ
1−δ < c. But note that V (φg, A) ≤
1


































which is a contradiction.
2. Suppose that there was an MPE in which the firm mixed in two consecutive















(1− ι)V (φgg, A)) + δ(1 − α)V (φgg, A),
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where V (φg, A) = φg and V (φgg, A) ≥ φgg > φg
This gives a contradiction since the RHS of second equation is strictly greater
than the RHS of the first, but the LHS of both is c, so it cannot be that both
equalities hold simultaneously.
A.2 Importance of predictability
Predictability of the attention states is what drives the coasting effect. To see this, let
us suppose that attention followed a Markov process just as described in the baseline
model, but that the firm never observed the state. In this case, even though the states
are persistent, from the firm’s perspective, there is no predictability. In this case,
inattention can never be better for incentives. Suppose the state at t = 0 is A. Then at













. Conditions for a full effort








> 1 + δ
δαV (φ)
1− ι+ α
⇐⇒ c < δ
1− ι+ α(1− δ)
1 − ι+ α(1− δ2)
.
It is clear that inattention makes full effort equilibria harder to sustain (the upper bound





















(1− ι)(1 − φ)
1− ι+ α
In this case it is again clear that inattention makes no effort easier to sustain. So,
inattention cannot help incentives.
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B Supplementary Appendix
B.1 Coasting under imperfect monitoring
Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. As mentioned in the main text, the coasting effect is robust to the introduction
of imperfect monitoring. It is easiest to see this if we consider equilibria with no effort.
We can show that no effort equilibria may be sustained under full attention but not
under inattention. We do not provide a complete analysis here, but rather demonstrate
that there exist ranges of parameter values for which the no effort equilibrium can be
sustained under full attention but not under inattention.
We provide the proof below. To see the intuition, think of a setting in which ι → 1
and α → 1. This is an environment in which the attentive state is sure to transit
to the inattentive state, and moreover the inattentive state is absorbing. An agent in
this environment has a strong incentive to work hard in the attentive state, because by
exerting effort just once she can improve her reputation and enjoy the benefits of this
increased reputation forever. Therefore, no effort is hard to sustain as an equilibrium
with this type of inattention, but may be sustainable under full attention.
Under full attention, the value function in a no effort equilibrium is given by





φ(1−η)+(1−φ)(1−ν) . Therefore, the condition for no effort to be an equilibrium is
given by
c > (η − ν)δ [V (φs)− V (φf )] .




1−δ and φs =
2φ
1+φ .
Now, V (φs)− V (φf ) = V (
2φ
1+φ)− V (0). Using the expression for the value function
above and simplifying we obtain






(V (φss)− V (0))
. Note that V (φs)− V (φf ) = V (φs)− V (0) < (V (φss)− V (0)). This follows from


















Now consider the case of inattention (with no effort).
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V (φ, I) = φ+ (1− φ)12 + διV (φ, I) + δ(1 − ι)V (φ,A)
V (φ,A) = φ+(1−φ)12+δανV (φs, I)+δ(1−α)νV (φs, A)+δα(1−ν)V (φf )+
δ(1 − α)(1− ν)V (φf )
The condition for no effort to be optimal (in the attentive phase) is given by:
c > δα(η−ν)V (φs, I)+δ(1−α)(η−ν)V (φs, A)−δα(η−ν)V (φf , I)−δ(1−α)(η−ν)V (φf , A).





Further, if we consider the case ι → 1 then we have V (φ, I) → 11−δ (φ + (1 − φ)
1
2 ).
Now let’s think about the case α → 1 and ι → 1. Then, the condition for no effort to
be optimal becomes

























Let us compare the two conditions for no effort to be optimal under full attention and
with inattention respectively. We know that no effort is sustained as an equilibrium
























(2− δ)(1 − δ)(1 + φ)
> 0,
which is true.
B.2 If the firm does not observe the current attention state
Suppose that the firm did not observe the current attention state of the consumer. We
can model this by altering the timing of the gams as follows:
1. At the start of any period t, φt ∈ [0, 1] denotes the current belief that firm is a
C-type, and ωt ∈ {A, I} denotes the current attention state.
2. The firm first collects the payment from the consumer pt(φt, ωt).
3. Then the firm makes its effort choice, at ∈ {H,L}, and an outcome, yt ∈ {g, b},
is realized.
4. An attention state ωt+1 is realized.
5. The outcome is observed or not by consumers, depending on the current atten-
tion state.
6. Consumers update their belief about the firm’s type to φt+1.
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7. Play proceeds to next period.
(i.e. 4 and 6 are reversed, relative to the baseline model)
Proposition 8. There exist parameter ranges in which no effort can be sustained as
an equilibrium under full attention, but is not an equilibrium with some inattention.
As for Proposition 7, our approach is to demonstrate a range of parameter values
in which no effort is an equilibrium under full attention but not under inattention. Let
us consider η = 1 and ν = 12 , so that φf = 0, φs =
2φ
1+φ and φss =
4φ
3φ+1 .
The approach is to show that with this monitoring structure there are values of
φ and δ such that the condition for a no effort equilibrium to exist under full atten-
tion is easier to satisfy then the condition under inattention. These conditions are
respectively:
c > δ(η − ν) [V (φs)− V (φf )] , and
c > (η − ν)δ(1− α) [V (φs, A)− V (φf , A)] .
Thus, it is sufficient to show that there are φ, δ where (1− α) [V (φ,A) − V (0, A)] >
V (φ) − V (0), to ensure that there exist values of c such that the first condition is
satisfied, and the second is violated. Let us set ι = 1 and α = 12 . Then, we have
V (0) = ν1−δ =
1
2(1−δ) .































[V (φss)− V (0)]
The first equality above follows from the definition of V (φ), the second by impos-
ing η = 1 and ν = 12 and simplifying. The next two are simple substitutions.
Note that V (φss) <
1












Next, note that when ι = 1 then V (φ, I) = ν+φ(η−ν)1−δ =
1+φ
2(1−δ) and
V (φ,A) − V (0) =
1 + φ
2
+ δαV (φ, I) +
δ(1− α)
2
V (φS , A) +
δ(1 − α)
2





























































[V (φss, A)− V (0)]
Setting α = 12 this writes as













































1−δ . It can readily be verified that this is true for a range of values of δ
and φ (satisfied when φ is high). For instance, δ = 0.9 and φ > 0.75 are such values.
B.3 Reputation-based Inattention
In this subsection, we consider an alternate model in which the consumer’s attention
does not evolve as a Markov process, but rather depends on the firm’s current reputa-
tion: The consumer is inattentive at some beliefs and attentive at others. For instance,
think of a setting in which the consumer pays attention only when the reputation is
intermediate: there is little to be learnt if the reputation of the firm is already extreme,
and so the consumer does not pay attention at extreme beliefs.
The remainder of the setting is as before. The long-run agent or firm is one of
two types: a commitment type that always exerts effort and an opportunistic type that
can exert high effort at cost c or else exert low effort at no cost. The consumer has
prior φ that the agent is the commitment type. As before, the firm’s effort choice can
result in one of two outcomes {g, b}. The outcome depends on the effort choice and
the monitoring structure: η = Pr(g|H) and ν = Pr(g|L) where η > ν. Consumers
value the good outcome at 1 and the bad outcome at 0. Consumers can be in one of
two attention states: Attentive or Inattentive. ω ∈ {A, I} When ω = A, they observe
the outcome, and when ω = I , they observe nothing. The attention state is a function
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of reputation in particular if φ ∈ ΦA the state is A and if φ /∈ ΦA the state is I
The timing of the game is as follows:
1. At the start of period the state is φt, the current belief that the firm is a commit-
ment type.
2. The firm first collects the payment from the consumer pt(φt)
3. The opportunistic firm makes effort choice.
4. Outcomes are observed or not by consumers depending on whether φt ∈ ΦA
or not. What consumers observe depends on the action choice and the current
attention state.
5. Consumers update belief about the firm type to φt+1
6. Play proceeds to next period.
For the sake of brevity, we do not provide a full analysis of the model. Rather, we
provide the conditions for a no effort equilibrium and argue that it is harder to sustain
under inattention than under full attention - once again establishing the coasting effect.
In this setting, a firm’s strategy is given by τ(φ) which is the probability with which a
firm plays H when the customer belief is φ. A Markov perfect equilibrium is a tuple
(τ(φ), p(φ), φg , φb, φI ) such that:
• At any belief φ (and implied attention state), the firm finds it optimal to play H
with probability τ(φ).
• The customer is willing to pay p(φ) which is the expected utility of the consumer
given φ and the strategy τ(φ). In particular,
p(φ) = ν + (φ+ (1− φ)τ(φ))(η − ν) (3)
• The posterior beliefs of customers, after observing outcomes g, b or nothing












Some observations, as in the baseline model, are almost immediate. First, in any
MPE the agent never exerts effort at degenerate beliefs. Second, in any MPE the agent
never exerts effort in the inattentive state. Finally, with perfect monitoring and pure
strategies, inattention cannot help effort incentives.
Notice that once the reputation φ is such that φ /∈ ΦA, consumers are no longer
updating their beliefs. Therefore, the inattentive state persists forever, and the firm
does not exert any effort. Accordingly, we say that in a no-effort equilibrium, we have
a “reputation trap.” Trivially, it follows that once you reach φN /∈ ΦA, there is no
effort and




ν + (η − ν)φ
1− δ
.
Consider the following illustrative example to show that the qualitative insights of
the exogenous attention model apply in the reputation-based attention case. Suppose
that φ ∈ ΦA but φg, φf /∈ ΦA where we suppose (for contradiction) that φg and φf
are defined under the assumption that the agent exerts no effort (that is that τ(φ) = 0).
This is akin to a consumer paying more attention to intermediate rather than extreme
reputations. Then the condition for no effort to be an equilibrium is given by
c
δ
> (η − ν)
[
V N (φg)− V
N (φb)
]




It is straightforward to show that there exist parameter ranges, where the above con-
dition not satisfied with reputation based attention, and yet no effort is an equilibrium
under full attention. The intuition is familiar: The agent has high stakes to enter an
inattentive reputation state with a high reputation.
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